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A number of recent studies examine productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) to
China’s domestic industrial enterprises. This study goes further by investigating the implications of
institutions for the nature of productivity spillovers during 1998-2007. We examine three institutional
features that comprise aspects of China’s “special characteristics”:  (1) the different sources of FDI,
where FDI is nearly evenly divided between mostly Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries and the region known as “Greater China”, consisting of Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Macau; (2) China’s heterogeneous ownership structure, involving state- (SOEs) and non-state
owned (non-SOEs) enterprises, firms with foreign equity participation, and non-SOE, domestic firms;
and (3) industrial promotion via tariffs or through tax holidays to foreign direct investment. We also
explore how productivity spillovers from FDI changed with China’s entry into the WTO in late 2001.
We find robust positive and significant spillovers to domestic firms via backward linkages (the contacts
between foreign buyers and local suppliers).  Our results suggest varied success with industrial promotion
policies.  Final goods tariffs as well as input tariffs are negatively associated with firm-level productivity.
However, we find that productivity spillovers were higher from foreign firms that paid less than the
statutory corporate tax rate.
Luosha Du
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I. Introduction   
 
Since opening its economy to the outside world in late 1978, China has 
absorbed an increasing amount of FDI. It is now among the world’s largest hosts for 
foreign investment, and has in recent years consistently ranked number one as the 
largest developing country recipient of FDI inflows. Potential technology transfer is 
likely to have been an important rationale behind the Chinese government’s 
aggressive efforts over the past two decades to attract foreign investment to China 
(Hu and Jefferson (2002)).  Indeed, the Chinese government has intervened 
extensively to promote industrialization in China, relying on a range of policy 
instruments.  These instruments include tariffs, tax subsidies, and promotion of 
foreign investors in key sectors.     
One typical justification for subsidizing incoming foreign investment is an 
externality in the form of productivity spillovers.    Productivity spillovers take place 
when the entry or presence of multinationals increases the productivity of domestic 
firms.  If such spillovers occur, then multinationals do not fully internalize the 
value of these benefits. We define intra-industry spillovers (also called horizontal 
spillovers) as occurring when domestic firm productivity is positively affected by 
firms with foreign equity participation located in the same sector, while 
inter-industry spillovers (vertical spillovers) occur when domestic firms are affected 
by firms with foreign equity in the upstream (forward linkage) or downstream 
sectors (backward linkages).     
A number of recent papers test for productivity spillovers from foreign 
investment. Most of these studies, such as papers by Haddad and Harrison (1993) on 
Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela, and Konings (2001) on 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, either failed to find evidence of horizontal spillovers 
or reported negative horizontal spillover effects. More recently, Javorcik (2004) and 
Blalock and Gertler (2008) argued that since multinationals may simultaneously 
have an incentive to prevent information leakage that would enhance the 
performance of their local competitors, while at the same time possibly benefitting 3 
 
from transferring knowledge to their local suppliers or clients, spillovers from FDI 
are more likely to be negative along the horizontal dimension and positive along the 
vertical dimension. Javorcik uses firm-level data from Lithuania and Blalock and 
Gertler (2008) use data for Indonesia to show that positive FDI spillovers take place 
through backward linkages (between foreign affiliates and their local suppliers); 
however, there is no robust evidence of positive spillovers occurring through either 
the horizontal or the forward linkage channel. 
One recent manuscript that investigates both horizontal and vertical FDI 
spillovers in China is Lin, Liu, and Zhang (2009).  In contrast to Javorcik (2004), 
Lin, Liu, and Zhang find bigger forward and smaller backward spillovers.  Our 
results will differ from theirs, in part because we focus on total factor productivity 
and they examine value-added productivity and also use a different estimation 
method. We also expand the analysis to explore the relationship between trade 
policies, tax incentives, and externalities from foreign investment.  To our 
knowledge, ours is the first study to explore—in China or elsewhere--how 
productivity gains from foreign investment vary with tax and tariff policies.   
There are also a set of theoretical studies demonstrating that positive FDI 
spillovers are more likely to operate across industry rather than within an industry. 
For instance, there are studies on the choice by multinationals to use FDI as a model 
of market penetration. These studies emphasize efforts to minimize the probability of 
imitation, especially under imperfect intellectual property rights in the host country. 
As Markusen and Venables (1998) point out, proximity to potential domestic 
competitors with absorptive capacity to reverse engineer proprietary technology 
would be detrimental to a multinational, thus motivating it to set up its subsidiaries 
where potential rivals cannot erode its market share. By contrast, the multinational 
can benefit from knowledge diffusion when it reaches downstream clients and 
upstream suppliers, which will encourage vertical flows of generic knowledge that 
lead to inter-industry spillovers. 
This study goes further by investigating the implications of the institutional 
context for the nature of spillovers.  In particular, we examine three institutional 4 
 
features that comprise aspects of China’s “special characteristics”: the different 
sources of FDI, which are nearly evenly divided between mostly OECD countries 
and the region sometimes referenced as “Greater China” (Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macau); China’s extraordinarily heterogeneous ownership structure, involving state, 
foreign, and domestic ownership, and tax incentives such as income tax subsidies 
and tariffs.  Many foreign investors in China over the last ten years have faced 
much lower corporate tax rates; before 2008, foreign investors received a 15 percent 
corporate tax rate while domestic enterprises faced a regular 33 percent corporate tax 
rate
4.  This policy of promoting foreign investors and other favored firms in China 
was only discontinued in 2008.     
In addition to exploring the differential effects of foreign investment linkages 
across special characteristics in explaining productivity performance, we also 
examine how the increasing exposure to globalization has affected Chinese firm 
performance.  Until 1990, average tariffs on manufacturing in China were as high 
as 50 percent.  There is a rich literature which examines the impact of trade 
liberalization on productivity, although there are fewer studies that disentangle the 
effects of input and output tariffs.    One example is Amiti and Konings (2007), who 
use Indonesia manufacturing census data to show that the effect of reducing input 
tariffs significantly increases productivity, and that this effect is much higher than 
reducing output tariffs. For China, Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2008) focus 
specifically on the impact of trade liberalization on productivity. Using Chinese 
firm-level data (1998-2005), they suggest that a ten percentage point reduction in 
final good output tariffs results in an increase in TFP of 0.42 percent.   
Our results suggest varied outcomes from promoting domestic productivity 
growth through these different instruments.    The benefits via vertical linkages from 
foreign investment have been significant and positive, but the impact of tariffs on 
                                                        
4  However, the government adjusted this preferential policy in 2008. Starting from Jan 1, 2008, 
the new corporate tax policy for foreign-invested firms is the following: foreign-invested firms 
that previously receive preferential corporate tax rates will return to the regular tax rate within 5 
years. In 2008, the tax rate increases from 15% to 18%; in 2009, the rate keeps increasing to 20%; 
in 2010, the corporate tax rate is 22% and will finally reach 25% in 2012.   5 
 
total factor productivity growth has been negative.  We find some horizontal 
externalities from foreign direct investment (FDI), although the positive effect as 
well as the significance varies across specifications.  We find particularly strong 
evidence of positive and significant vertical linkages to domestic firms via backward 
linkages.    Productivity of domestically owned firms has been boosted primarily via 
contacts between domestic suppliers and foreign buyers of their products. 
This paper also shows that firm ownership and sources of FDI significantly 
affect the magnitude of FDI spillovers. After we recalculate sector-level FDI based 
on its origin
5, we find that investors from “Greater China” and those from the rest of 
the world, largely the OECD region, generate completely different horizontal 
linkages for domestic firms. That is, OECD investors do help domestic firms located 
in the same industry whereas investors from the region of “Great China” hurt their 
domestic counterparts or have no impact.     
For trade policy, our results suggest a negative, significant effect of final goods 
tariffs on domestic productivity.  We also test for the effects of input tariffs on 
productivity, and find negative and significant effects of input tariffs on productivity. 
Exploiting the exogenous change in trade policies with China’s entry into the WTO 
at the end of 2001, we find that the magnitude of backward linkages increased with 
trade liberalization. 
Finally, we explore the rationale for tax subsidies bestowed on foreign investors.   
If the Chinese government correctly targets, through tax concessions, those firms 
with greater potential for capturing spillovers, we would expect stronger linkages 
associated with tax breaks.  We find statistically significant evidence of stronger 
productivity externalities associated with firms that received tax breaks.   
Our empirical strategy follows Javorcik (2004) and Olley and Pakes (1996) 
(henceforth OP). First, we use Javorcik’s (2004) empirical strategies to calculate 
Backward and Forward linkages and follow her estimation models to test whether 
                                                        
5  This means that we will have two sets of sector-level FDI variables. One of them is calculated based on foreign 
investment contributed by Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau investors and the other set is obtained based on 
foreign assets provided by investors from outside the “Greater China” region.    Because these other investors are 
largely located in the EU, North America, Japan, and S. Korea, we refer to this other FDI sources as “OECD”   
foreign investment. 6 
 
there are vertical FDI spillovers in the manufacturing sector in China. We address the 
endogeneity of inputs by applying the strategy proposed by OP.  We also apply a 
variety of specifications to take into account firm-specific fixed effects, and find that 
our results are robust to these alternative approaches.     
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the basic 
framework and the data used in this paper.  We also review broad trends for the 
1998 through 2007 period. Section III discusses the econometric issues and presents 
the empirical results. Section IV concludes.   
 
II.  Basic Framework and Data   
 
  Section II.A describes the analytical framework, estimation equation, and 
measures for constructing the key spillover variables that we use.  Section II.B 
describes the key features of our firm-level panel data set and the summary statistics 
for our sample period.     
 
A.  Basic  Framework 
 
To examine the impact of intra- and inter-industry FDI spillovers and trade 
policy across various institutional dimensions on firm productivity, we employ the 
following basic model, inspired by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004): 
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Yijt  is the quantity produced by firm i in sector j at time t.  It is calculated by 
deflating the output value (quantities*prices) by the sector-specific ex-factory price 
index of industrial products in order to separately identify quantity
6. Kijt, capital, is 
                                                        
6  Sector-specific ex-factory price indices for industrial products came from China Urban Life and Price 
Yearbook (2008, Table 4-3-3). The price indices are published for 29 individual sectors.     7 
 
defined as the value of fixed assets, which is deflated by the fixed assets investment 
index, and Lijt is the total number of employees. Mijt represents the intermediate 
inputs purchased by firms to use for production of final products, which is deflated 
by the intermediate input price index.
7  ForeignShareHKTMijt, ForeignShareFRijt and 
StateShareijt are defined as the share of the firm’s total equity owned by Hong 
Kong-Taiwan-Macau investors, foreign investors, and the state respectively. The 
omitted share, the non-state domestically-owned share, is represented by the constant 
term.  By construction, these three firm-level controls are continuous variables and 
range from 0 to 1 in value
8.  
The motivation for separating foreign share into two types is two-fold.  First, 
we would like to see whether some types of foreign investment are more likely to 
result in productivity spillovers than others.  Second, anecdotal evidence suggests 
large quantities of so-called foreign investors in China are actually domestic 
investors who channel investment through Hong Kong in order to take advantage of 
special treatment for foreign firms (so-called “round tripping”).  If this is the case, 
then we would expect that foreign investment of this type might have a smaller 
impact on domestic firms. 
Following Javorcik (2004), we define three sector-level FDI variables. First, 
Horizontaljt captures the extent of foreign presence in sector j at time t and is defined 
as foreign equity participation averaged over all firms in the sector, weighted by each 
firm’s share in sectoral output. In other words,   












it it jt Y Y re ForeignSha Horizontal , 
where  it re ForeignSha is the sum of  reHKTM ForeignSha and  reFR ForeignSha . 
Second, Backwardjt captures the foreign presence in the sectors that are supplied by 
sector j
9. Therefore, Backwardjt  is a measure for foreign participation in the 
                                                        
7  Price indices for fixed investment and industry-wide intermediate inputs are obtained from the Statistical 
Yearbook (2006) (obtained from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
8  In some specifications, we run regressions with domestic firms only. In these cases, we use the sample of pure 
domestic firms, which have zero foreign investment. Then we regress either the log of the firm’s output or 
productivity on sector-level FDI without the variable “Foreign Share”.   
9  For instance, both the furniture and apparel industries use leather to produce leather sofas and leather jackets. 8 
 
downstream industries of sector j.    It is defined as   
). 3 ( kt
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The value of jk is taken from the 2002 input-output table
10 representing the 
proportion of sector j’s production supplied to sector k.  Finally, Forwardjt  is 
defined as the weighted share of output in upstream industries of sector j produced 
by firms with foreign capital participation. As Javorcik points out, since only 
intermediates sold in the domestic market are relevant to the study, goods produced 
by foreign affiliates for exports (Xit) should be excluded.  Thus, the following 
formula is applied:   
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jm jt X Y X Y re ForeignSha Forward   
The value of jm is also taken from 2002 input-output table. Since Horizontaljt 
already captures linkages between firms within a sector, inputs purchased within 
sector j are excluded from both Backwardjt and Forwardjt. 
 
B. Data and Broad Trends 
 
The dataset employed in this paper was collected by the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics. The Statistical Bureau conducts an annual survey of industrial 
plants, which includes manufacturing firms as well as firms that produce and supply 
electricity, gas, and water. It is firm-level based, including all state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), regardless of size, and non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) with annual sales 
of more than 5 million yuan. We use a ten-year unbalanced panel dataset, from 1998 
to 2007.  The number of firms per year varies from a low of 162,033 in 1999 to a 
high of 336,768 in 2007. The sampling strategy is the same throughout the sample 
period (all firms that are state-owned or have sales of more than 5 million yuan are 
selected into the sample); the variation of numbers of enterprises across years may 
                                                                                                                                                               
Suppose the leather processing industry sells 1/3 of its output to furniture producers and 2/3 of its output to jacket 
producers. If no multinationals produce furniture but half of all jacket production comes from foreign affiliates, 
the Backward variable will be calculated as follows: 1/3*0+2/3*1/2=1/3.   
10  Input-ouput tables of China (2002) Table 4.2, which divides manufacturing industry into 71 sectors.   9 
 
be driven by changes in ownership classification or by increases (or reductions) in 
sales volume in relation to the 5 million yuan threshold. However, the data show that 
5 million yuan is not a strict rule. Among non-SOEs, about 6 percent of the firms 
report annual sales of less than 5 million yuan in 1998; this number rises to 8 percent 
by 1999 and falls after 2003. In 2007, only 1 percent of non-SOEs have annual sales 
below 5 million yuan. In terms of the full sample, the percent of firms with sales less 
than 5 million yuan stays at the same level for 1998 and 1999 and starts falling in 
2000. In 2007, around 2 percent of the sample consists of firms with annual sales 
less than 5 million yuan.     
The original dataset includes 2,226,104 observations and contains identifiers 
that can be used to track firms over time. Since the study focuses on manufacturing 
firms, we eliminate non-manufacturing observations. The sample size is further 
reduced by deleting missing values, as well as observations with negative or zero 
values for output, number of employees, capital, and the inputs, leaving a sample 
size of 1,842,786. Due to incompleteness of information on official output price 
indices, three sectors are dropped from the sample
11. Thus, our final regression 
sample size is 1,545,626.   
The dataset contains information on output, fixed assets, total workforce, total 
wages, intermediate input costs, foreign investment, Hong Kong-Taiwan-Macau 
investment, sales revenue, and export sales. These are the key variables from which 
we obtain measures of firm-level foreign asset shares and the FDI spillover variable, 
which are discussed in detail in the next section. In this paper, to test the impact of 
FDI spillovers on domestic firm productivity, we use the criterion of zero foreign 
ownership to distinguish domestic firms and foreign owned firms, that is, domestic 
firms are those with zero foreign capital in their total assets.  In the dataset, 
1,197,597 observations meet the criterion
12.  
                                                        
11  They are the following sectors: processing food from agricultural products; printing, reproduction of recording 
media; and general purpose machinery.     
12  Actually, the international criterion used to distinguish domestic and foreign-invested firms is 10%, that is, the 
share of subscribed capital owned by foreign investors is equal to or less than 10%.    In the earlier version of the 
paper, we tested whether the results are sensitive to using zero, 10%, and 25% foreign ownership. Our results 
show that between the zero and 10% thresholds, the magnitude and the significance levels of the estimated 
coefficients remain close, which makes us comfortable using the more restrictive sample of domestic firms for 10 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in the 
regressions. The summary statistics indicate the mean of the ratios, which is different 
than weighted means which would give more weight to larger firms.    The first three 
columns report means for levels and the last three columns report means for growth 
rates of the key variables used in the analysis. 
The statistical means highlight the remarkable growth rates exhibited by the 
manufacturing sector during this period, with average real output growing 13.5 
percent a year, and the net capital stock growing 10.7 percent per year.    Labor input 
grew significantly slower, with average annual increases of only 1.3 percent per year.   
Total factor productivity grew on average 5.6 percent per year, implying a forty 
percent contribution to overall growth.  The means also document that on average 
foreign-invested assets have been almost evenly split between sources in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Macau (“HKTM”), and foreign investment originating in other 
locations.  The state continues to play an important role in manufacturing, with a 
mean asset share of 8.9 percent during the sample period; over the sample period the 
share of total foreign investment in manufacturing is significantly larger, at 16.8 
percent.  For the sample as a whole, the average state share during this period fell 
by approximately 0.7 percentage point per year. 
In Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, we provide summary statistics for the four sets 
of spillover variables.  Table 2-1 shows that the share of foreign-invested assets at 
the sector level, the horizontal foreign share, increased over the sample period from 
20.4 to 26.7 percent.    To take into account the sources of FDI for sectoral spillovers, 
we re-calculate sector-level FDI variables from two broad geographic categories. To 
explore the importance of the source of foreign investment within the firm for 
productivity, we calculate firm-level foreign investment, horizontal foreign shares, 
and vertical foreign shares for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau FDI, and for foreign 
investment originating in other locations, i.e. principally the OECD countries.  
Table 2-2 shows basic summary statistics for these two sets of sectoral spillover 
                                                                                                                                                               
which the foreign capital share is zero. The results based on the 25% criterion exhibit small differences, but the 
results are generally robust to the choice of definition for foreign versus domestic ownership.   11 
 
variables.   The basic summary statistics show that the two sets have exhibited 
different trends over time. FDI shares for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau 
investment steadily increased over the period of 1998-2003. In contrast, FDI from 
other regions shows an even faster and steadily increasing pattern of growth over the 
entire time period, with more than a doubling of foreign investment shares.  It is 
clear from Tables 2-2 that most of the increase in foreign investment over 1998-2007 
originated outside of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. 
Table 2-3 reports trends in subsidized and non-subsidized foreign investment.  
While the standard tax rate across all firms during the sample period was 33 percent, 
a large share of foreign-owned firms were granted tax subsidies, thus  facing tax 
rates that were significantly lower.  In the left panel of Table 2-3, we redefine our 
sector-level foreign share variables by restricting them to only those foreign firms 
who paid less than the statutory tax rate. In the right panel of Table 2-3, we redefined 
sector-level foreign share to restrict it to those firms who paid the full rate.  The 
trends show a steady increase in subsidized foreign investment between 1998 and 
2007.  By the end of the sample period, the majority of foreign investors received 
some form of a tax subsidy. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of taxes paid by different types of enterprises 
for the year 2004.   The top left-hand side quadrant shows that a large share of 
non-SOEs paid the 33 percent tax rate.    However, only a small minority of 
foreign-invested firms paid the statutory rate, as indicated by the bottom right-hand 
side quadrant.  In 2004, 7 percent of foreign-invested firms paid the statutory rate, 
compared to almost 40 percent for domestically-owned enterprises. In figure 2, we 
re-plot the tax distribution with the domestic non-SOEs (non-foreign and non-SOE 
enterprises) and find that more than 35% of firms paid the 33 percent tax rate.   
Table 2-4 reports the percentage of firms who were subsidized based on 
value-added taxes, which are reported separately from income taxes on profits.  
Fewer firms receive subsidies in the form of exemptions on value-added taxes.  
These exemptions increased until 2003, then declined.  It is clear from these tables 
that income tax holidays were a more pervasive form of incentives until the 2008 tax 12 
 
reform.   
 
III.  Estimation and Results   
A.  Baseline Results 
   We begin the analysis by estimating the model described in equation (1) using 
ordinary least square (OLS) with and without firm fixed effects.  Columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 3 are estimated with the dependent variable as the log of the firm’s 
deflated output. To study the impact of FDI spillovers on the performance of 
domestic firms, we are interested in how FDI invested in other firms affect the 
domestic firms located in the same sector. Therefore, the key parameters in the above 
specification are 7  , 8   and 9  .  
One possibility that has not been explored in the literature on vertical and 
horizontal linkages is that foreign investment shares are proxying for different trade 
policies across sectors. Protected sectors may be more likely to receive foreign 
investment as these firms may be motivated to relocate in order to circumvent tariff 
or non-tariff barriers (“tariff-jumping” foreign investment, which leads to 
immiserizing effects as modeled by Diaz Alejandro (1977)).    In this case, the gains 
from foreign investment could be under-estimated due to omitted variable bias.     
     To control for the effects of trade policies, we have created a time series of 
tariffs, obtained from the World Integrated Trading Solution (WITS), maintained by 
the World Bank.  We aggregated tariffs to the same level of aggregation as the 
foreign investment data, using output for 2003 as weights.    We also created forward 
and backward tariffs, to correspond with our vertical FDI measures.  Table 1 and 
Table A-5 show basic summary statistics for these tariff variables.  During the 
sample period, average tariffs fell nearly 9 percentage points, which is a significant 
change over a short time period.  While the average level of tariffs during this 
period, which spans the years before and after WTO accession, was nearly 13 
percent, this average masks significant heterogeneity across sectors, with a high of 
41 percent in grain mill products and a low of 4 percent in railroad equipment.     13 
 
    We initially pool the data to include both firms with and without foreign 
investment, reporting results with and without firm fixed effects.  The first column 
of Table 3, with the application of fixed effects, shows that firm productivity levels 
are higher for firms with participation from other (OECD) investors than those from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, and lower for firms with state-owned assets.  
There are no significant horizontal spillovers, but backward vertical linkages are 
positive and statistically significant.  Final goods tariffs are negative and 
significantly associated with productivity in the OLS fixed effect specifications, but 
not in the fixed effect specifications.  This suggests that tariffs are imposed in 
sectors where productivity is lower, but the association between changes in tariffs 
and changes in productivity across all firms is weak.    We will see that the negative 
significance of tariffs is stronger when we split the sample based on ownership 
differences later in the paper. 
  Comparing the fixed effects results in the first column with the second column 
(where firm fixed effects are omitted), the results are consistent across the two 
specifications.   As expected, the coefficient on capital’s output elasticity is 
attenuated with the fixed effect estimator.  While foreign-invested firms are much 
more efficient and state-invested enterprises are much less efficient than the 
non-state-domestically-invested enterprises that represent the reference, once firm 
fixed effects are controlled for the differences are much smaller.  Such differences 
suggest important differences between productivity levels and growth rates of state 
owned and foreign enterprises versus other types of enterprises.     
  Also using the entire sample, the third and fourth columns of Table 3 
compare OLS and fixed effect estimates using Olley and Pakes (1996) to correct for 
the potential endogeneity of input choice. The earlier literature on production 
function estimation shows that the use of OLS is inappropriate when estimating 
productivity, since this method treats labor, capital and other input variables as 
exogenous. As Griliches and Mairesse (1995) argue, inputs should be considered 
endogenous since they are chosen by a firm based on its productivity. Firm-level 
fixed effects will not solve the problem, because time-varying productivity shocks 14 
 
can affect a firm’s input decisions. 
Using OLS will therefore bias the estimations of coefficients on the input 
variables. To solve the simultaneity problem in estimating a production function, we 
employ the procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP), which 
uses investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. OP address the 
endogeneity problem as follows. Let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas 
production function in logs: 
it it it m it l it k it m l k y           . 
it y , it k , it l , and  it m   represent log of output, capital, labor, and materials, 
respectively.  it   is the productivity and  it   is the error term (or a shock to 
productivity). The key difference between  it   and  it   is that  it   affects firm’s 
input demand while the latter does not. OP also make timing assumptions regarding 
the input variables. Labor and materials are free variables but capital is assumed to 
be a fixed factor and subject to an investment process. Specifically, at the beginning 
of every period, the investment level a firm decides together with the current capital 
value determines the capital stock at the beginning of the nest period, i.e. 
it it it i k k     ) 1 ( 1  . 
    The key innovation of OP estimation is to use firm’s observable characteristics 
to model a monotonic function of firm’s productivity. Since the investment decision 
depends on both productivity and capital, OP formulate investment as follows, 
) , ( it it it it k i i   . 
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   . 
Substituting this into the production function, we get the following, 
it it it t it m it l
it it it t it m it l it k it
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    In the first stage of OP estimation, the consistent estimates of coefficients on 
labor and materials as well as the estimate of a non-parametrical term ( t  ) are 
obtained. The second step of OP identifies the coefficient on capital through two 
important assumptions. One is the first-order Markov assumption of productivity, 
it   and the timing assumption about it k . The first-order Markov assumption 
decomposes  it   into its conditional expectation at time t-1, ] | [ 1  it it E   , and a 
deviation from that expectation,  it  , which is often referred to the “innovation” 
component of the productivity measure. These two assumptions allow it to construct 
an orthogonal relationship between capital and the innovation component in 
productivity, which is used to identify the coefficient on capital.       
    The biggest disadvantage of applying the OP procedure is that many firms 
report zero or negative investment. To address this problem, we also explore the 
robustness of our results to using the Levinsohn Petrin (2003) approach. With the 
Olley and Pakes correction, we can get an unbiased estimate of the firm’s 
productivity. Therefore, the independent variable then becomes total factor 
productivity (TFP) instead of the log of output. Specifically, this is a two-stage 
estimation procedure when using TFP as the dependent variable. The first step is to 
use OP to obtain unbiased coefficients on input variables and then calculate TFP 
(residual from the production function). Estimates of input coefficients from the first 
step using both OLS with firm fixed effects as well as the Olley-Pakes procedure are 
reported in Appendix Table A-1.  The second step is to regress TFP on firm-level 
controls and FDI variables.   
    Moulton showed that in the case of regressions performed on micro units that 
also include aggregated market (in this case industry) variables, the standard errors 
from OLS will be underestimated. As Moulton demonstrated, failing to take account 
of this serious downward bias in the estimated errors results in spurious findings of 
the statistical significance for the aggregate variable of interest. To address this issue, 16 
 
the standard errors in the paper are clustered for all observations in the same 
industry.  
As a robustness check, we also employed the procedure suggested by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for 
unobserved productivity shocks. With LP’s correction, the estimation procedure is 
also two-stage.  In the first stage, we obtain input shares and calculate the firm’s 
total factor productivity (TFP) (i.e., the residuals from production function). In the 
second stage, we regress TFP on the remaining independent regressors in this initial 
specification.  However, to save on space we only report the results using the OP, 
and not the LP procedure.  The results are qualitatively similar using both 
approaches.  The results in the last two columns of Table 3 present the pooled 
estimates using the OP method.  Across all specifications, the coefficient on the 
backward measure varies between .8 and 1.1. The coefficient, which is significant 
across specifications, implies that a one percentage point increase in backward FDI 
would be associated with between a .8 and 1.1 percentage point increase in output.  
These magnitudes are twice as large as those found by Blalock and Gertler (2008) 
for Indonesia but smaller than in Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania.  Javorcik (2004) 
found that a comparable 1 % increase in the share of FDI through backward linkages 
would boost TFP by 3 to 4 %, which is 3 to 4 times bigger. 
The coefficients on horizontal and forward are generally not significant.  The 
point estimates, at 0.16, imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of 
(horizontal or forward) FDI would be associated with a .16 percentage point increase 
in output. 
The specifications in Table 3 do not distinguish between domestic firms or 
foreign-invested enterprises.  In all the results which follow, we separate firms into 
foreign-invested firms—those with some positive foreign ownership—and 
domestically-owned firms—defined as enterprises with zero foreign ownership.  
The baseline results, which incorporate firm fixed effects, are presented in Table 4.  
Comparing the results across three different samples (all, foreign-invested, and 
domestic firms) shows differences in the patterns of FDI spillovers across different 17 
 
groups.  Horizontal spillovers are significantly positive only for domestic firms.  
The coefficient estimate, at .19, indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in 
horizontal FDI would be associated with a .19 percentage point increase in output.   
Backward linkages are similar in magnitude to the previous results.  The 
coefficient estimates, around .8, indicate that a percentage point increase in 
backward FDI would lead to an increase in output for domestic enterprises of .8 
percentage points.  Foreign-invested enterprises benefit from other foreign 
investment through both backward and forward linkages, indicating benefits to 
foreign-invested enterprises from purchasing inputs from other foreign firms.  The 
magnitudes of the vertical linkages are generally larger for foreign-invested firms, 
suggesting that firms with foreign equity are even more likely to benefit from being 
near other joint ventures.     
The F-tests listed at the bottom of the Table 4 identify whether these differences 
are statistically significant. As reported in the F-tests, the magnitudes are 
significantly larger for foreign-invested firms vis-à-vis forward linkages but not 
significantly different with regards to backward linkages.  This implies that 
foreign-invested firms benefit more than domestically-invested firms from 
interacting with upstream foreign suppliers.    Due to these significant differences, in 
the rest of the paper we separately report the effects of horizontal and vertical 
spillovers on firms according to their degree of foreign asset participation.   
Our results show that positive externalities are operating via all of the linkages: 
horizontal, forward and backward. The positive forward linkages imply that 
enterprises benefit from foreign firms that are upstream to their operations.  The 
evidence is also consistent with strong backward linkages, suggesting that 
enterprises benefit from foreign firms that are downstream, who may use domestic 
firms as input suppliers.    With the sample of all and domestic firms, the coefficient 
on the state’s share in equity in Table 4 is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that increases (decreases) in state-invested shares are associated with 
falling (increasing) productivity.  We discuss the different effects of spillovers 
across ownership categories in more detail in subsection C below.  The results on 18 
 
the state share are consistent with rising productivity for privatizing enterprises.  
We also find that the coefficients on the final goods tariff measures are generally 
negative and statistically significant; our expanded discussion on the role of trade 
policy is in subsection D below.     
Our results differ significantly from Javorcik (2004) and other studies of vertical 
linkages through foreign investment; all previous  studies find significant and 
positive coefficients for “Backward” but not for “Forward”, and they explain that the 
vertical spillovers occurred through contracts between multinational consumers and 
domestic suppliers. In our case, an additional linkage occurs—vertical spillovers 
take place through contracts between domestic firms who source inputs from 
multinational suppliers as well.   
One possible explanation is that the foreign participation in the upstream 
sectors may increase the variety of inputs and provide more sources of inputs to the 
downstream firms and thus lead to a higher productivity in downstream firms.  
Ethier (1982) provides theoretical support for this argument, showing that access to a 
greater variety of inputs results in a higher productivity of downstream industries. 
Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2008) also show that FDI can improve the 
performance of downstream firms by increasing the range of intermediate inputs 
available.   Since costs of intermediate inputs account for a much larger share of 
output than is typically the case in other countries, it is not surprising that access to 
lower cost or higher quality inputs has such a significant impact on domestic firm 
productivity.   
To the extent that foreign investors induced additional competition among 
supplying enterprises, we would expect that foreign firms would have led to 
downward pressure on prices in those sectors where backward linkages are greatest.   
Without proper deflators, this would have appeared as falling productivity in those 
sectors, with falling prices being misinterpreted as falling output instead.    One way 
to test if this possibility is correct is to examine whether sector-level prices during 
the sample period were systematically related to foreign activity.  Appendix Table 
A-2 shows that this is indeed the case.  Price levels fell significantly in sectors 19 
 
where foreign firms exerted a significant downward pressure via backward linkages.   
Since industry-level fixed effects are included in the estimation, the results can be 
interpreted to suggest that one important vehicle through which foreign firms played 
a key role was by exerting downward pressure on prices of domestic suppliers.    The 
evidence on the competition effect induced by foreign firms on prices of input 
suppliers reported in Table A-2 is also useful in another respect.  It illustrates the 
importance of using sector-specific price deflators (or prices) when identifying the 
spillovers from foreign investment, and explains why previous work on China failed 
to identify backward spillovers.     
In Table A-1, we compare the coefficient estimates using OLS with firm fixed 
effects and the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach.  Olley and Pakes (1996), as well as 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) predict, after implementing these two-stage procedures, 
that the coefficient on L should decrease, the coefficient on intermediate inputs 
should decrease and the coefficient on capital should increase.  The results are 
generally consistent with these predictions across ownership classes.  The 
coefficient on capital inputs is higher using OP across all specifications.  We also 
generally find that the coefficient on the labor shares and material shares are lower 
with OP.    What is unusual across all specifications is that the labor share is very low, 
compared to estimates for other countries, while the coefficient for input costs is 
very high.  As a robustness check, we performed two tests.  First, we calculated 
the share of labor expenditures in total output—the labor share in output according 
t o   t h e   d a t a .   U n d e r   c e r t a i n   p l a u s i b l e   r e s t r i c t i o n s   ( i . e . ,                 
Cobb-Douglas production function, perfect competition) the coefficients on the 
factor inputs in our estimating equations should equal the factor shares.  Imposing 
these restrictions, the estimate of labor’s share over the sample period is around 10 
percent (reported in column (5) of Table A-3), which is similar to the underlying 
OLS fixed effect estimates reported in Table A-1.    Second, we compare the implied 
average wages from our sample (calculated by dividing total wages by the number of 
employees with average wages reported in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook for 1998 
through 2007. The results are listed in Appendix Table A-3.  From Table A-3, we 20 
 
can see that the average wages from the dataset are close to that from the statistical 
yearbook, although there are some differences.  We also compute in column (6) of 
Table A-3 the ratio of both wages and non-wage costs to total output, and the 
average is not much different than 10 percent.    While labor’s share could be too low 
and the share of intermediate inputs too high, we feel confident that the factor shares 
implied by the OLS and OP coefficient estimates are broadly consistent with the 
factor shares in our data as well as external evidence.     
 
B.    The Effects of Different Sources of Foreign Investment 
 
In many FDI spillover studies, all domestic firms are assumed to benefit equally 
from FDI. However, different indigenous firms have varying absorptive capacities 
and the effectiveness of technology diffusion depends on technological capacities of 
indigenous firms as well as the characteristics of the foreign investors. To provide 
insights into the effect of this externality of FDI spillovers, we divide sector-level 
FDI variables into two groups based on their sources. The results are reported in 
Table 5.   
The results point to significant and large differences in vertical as well as 
horizontal linkages which depend on the origin of the foreign investors.  While 
horizontal linkages, which are not differentiated by country of ownership of the 
foreign investors, are sometimes insignificant, this average hides significant and 
contrasting effects.  Horizontal linkages are negative but not significant for sectors 
with large shares of foreign investors originating in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
suggesting that these firms act as competitors for domestically-owned firms.  In 
contrast, horizontal linkages are positive and significant for foreign investment 
originating in other countries, suggesting that there are positive linkages within the 
same sector for foreign investment coming from further afield.  The coefficient 
estimate, at .35, indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in horizontal FDI from 
sources other than Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau is associated with an increase in 
output of .35 percent. 21 
 
The results are also different for vertical linkages.  There are strong, positive 
and significant backward and forward linkages for foreign investors originating 
outside of “Greater China”.  These differences are statistically significant for 
horizontal and vertical forward linkages, as indicated by the formal tests of equality 
reported at the bottom of Table 5.  These results point to clear differences in the 
pattern of productivity spillovers depending on the source of foreign investment.  
Foreign firms coming from nearby regions act as competition in the same industry.  
Firms coming from further away are not direct competitors and convey positive 
horizontal and vertical externalities. 
 
C.    The Effect of State Ownership 
 
In China, state-owned firms include firms that are formally classified as 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), state-owned jointly operated enterprises and wholly 
state-owned companies. Non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) include 
collectively- and privately-owned firms. Compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are typically 
larger and often technically competitive but less market-oriented; they also face 
softer budget constraints and limited access to private financial capital. Indigenous 
Chinese firms of different ownership typically behave differently with respect to 
imitation, innovation and competition, and have different technological capabilities 
for knowledge absorption from the presence of foreign firms (Li et al. 2001).     
In Tables 3 and 4, we saw that the coefficient on the state’s share in equity in 
Table 4 is generally negative and statistically significant, indicating that increases 
(decreases) in state-invested shares are associated with falling (increasing) 
productivity.  The coefficient estimates, which vary from -.02 to -.13, suggest that 
after controlling for other factors, moving from 100 percent SOE to 100 percent 
private would be associated with a gain in productivity of 2 to 13 percentage points.   
Now we will explore whether productivity spillovers differ with ownership type. 
In Table 6, we divide the sample of all, foreign-invested, and domestic firms 
into two groups, SOEs and non-SOEs, to test whether the formal ownership structure 22 
 
and the composition of asset ownership matter for FDI spillover effects and trade 
policies.  In columns (1) and (2), which present the results from OLS regressions 
with firm fixed effects, both enterprises with and without foreign equity participation 
are included in the analysis together.  Columns (3) and (4) show the results using 
the sample of foreign-invested firms, and columns (5) and (6) present the results 
using the sample of purely domestic firms, defined as enterprises with zero foreign 
equity participation. All specifications allow for firm-specific effects and year 
effects. 
The first two columns allow us to compare the impact of firm-level equity 
participation by foreign investors on the productivity of SOEs relative to non-SOEs.   
The coefficient on foreign participation from foreign investors outside of Greater 
China for SOEs is .098 relative to .0052 for non-SOEs.  This suggests that foreign 
equity participation is associated with an improvement in productivity which is 
twenty times greater for SOEs.  The much larger and statistically significant 
coefficient associated with foreign equity participation in SOEs is consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms with foreign equity have played an important role in improving 
the performance of some SOEs.   
There is also evidence that SOEs benefit more from vertical linkages, as the 
magnitudes on backward as well as forward linkages are greater for SOEs.  The 
coefficients are larger for SOEs, suggesting that foreign investment has played a 
particularly large role in enhancing productivity of SOEs, including those without 
foreign equity participation.  The only exception is with horizontal spillovers.  
Horizontal spillovers are restricted to domestic non-SOEs, suggesting that SOEs 
may not be able to benefit from productivity spillovers through firms with foreign 
equity participation located in the same sector. 
  
D.  Trade and FDI Spillovers 
 
While there is a large literature which investigates the impact of FDI on 
productivity, as well as an even larger literature that explores the relationship 23 
 
between trade policies and productivity (for an overview of both these topics, see 
Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010)), we are not aware of any study which 
examines how changing trade policies affect the magnitude of FDI spillovers.  In 
this section, we begin by summarizing the impact of tariffs on firm-level 
productivity from the previous tables, then explore the interaction between 
productivity spillovers from foreign investment and changes in trade policy. 
The coefficient on the final good tariff measure in Tables 3 through 5 is 
generally negative and statistically significant.  These results are somewhat 
different from Brandt et al. (2008), who found weak evidence of a significant 
relationship between tariffs and total factor productivity for Chinese enterprises.  
There are several reasons why the negative impact of input or final goods tariffs on 
productivity may be under-estimated. A large fraction of firms are granted 
exemptions from paying tariffs; without additional information on which firms pay 
input tariffs, it is difficult to identify the negative effect of tariffs on inputs.    Second, 
average tariffs may be imposed for a number of reasons.  If tariffs are successfully 
imposed in sectors where there are externalities in production, then the average 
effect of tariffs reflects both (beneficial) targeting and (harmful) disincentives 
associated with x-inefficiency.  Third, to the extent that Melitz (2003) is correct, 
then many of the productivity gains associated with trade reform occur through 
reallocation of production towards more efficient firms, rather than within-firm 
productivity increases associated with greater exposure to international competition.     
In Table 6, we do find significant but different responses across SOEs and 
non-SOES to trade policy. Higher final goods tariffs are associated with significantly 
lower productivity for SOEs, relative to non-SOEs.  The point estimates on final 
goods tariffs, which is -.0676 for SOEs with foreign investment and -.0519 for those 
with no foreign assets, suggests that a 1 percent reduction in tariffs (ceteris paribus) 
would increase productivity by .05 to .07 percent.  One possible interpretation of 
the larger effect of final goods tariffs on SOE performance is the greater importance 
of international competition for SOEs, which are often shielded from competition or 
supported by the government through a variety of subsidies. 24 
 
In Table 7, we report the basic specification (column 5 of Table 6) in the first 
column.  In the second column, we interact the vertical and horizontal FDI 
measures with our tariff measures.  The three interaction terms are all negative, 
indicating that higher tariffs are associated with lower vertical and horizontal 
spillovers from FDI.  The addition of the interaction term for the horizontal 
measure doubles its magnitude.  To the extent that horizontal FDI is likely to have 
stronger positive effects on productivity when tariffs are low, then omitting the 
interaction term can lead to under-estimating horizontal linkages. 
We continue to explore the role of trade in understanding the importance of 
vertical and horizontal linkages in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.  We divide the 
sample across exporting and non-exporting firms.  Since exporters are more likely 
to benefit from associations with firms in other countries, we might expect smaller 
linkages.  On the other hand, exporters may be more likely to exploit knowledge 
gained from association with foreign investors.  The results in Table 7 suggest that 
backward linkages are no different across exporting and non-exporting enterprises.  
However, horizontal linkages are much larger for non-exporters and only significant 
for that group.    These results suggest that horizontal linkages in China were highest 
for firms which would not normally have had contact with international markets 
through export sales. 
In Table 8, we explore how vertical and horizontal linkages vary over the 
ten-year sample period.  With China’s entry into the WTO in the middle of the 
sample period, at the end of 2001, domestic content rules became illegal and tariffs 
were significantly reduced.   The results in Table 8 suggest that vertical linkages 
were strengthened during the second half of the sample period, when tariffs were 
lowered and domestic content restrictions relaxed.    Backward linkages only become 
large in magnitude and significant with China’s entry into the WTO.  Forward 
linkages also become significant and positive later in the sample period. 
 
E.   The Effects of Tax Incentives for FDI 
 25 
 
In Tables 9 and 10 we explore the extent to which subsidized foreign 
investment is more likely to convey spillovers relative to unsubsidized foreign 
investment.  While the standard tax rates across all firms during the sample period 
was 33 percent, a large share of foreign-owned firms were granted tax subsidies and 
faced tax rates that were significantly lower.  Indeed, the means reported in Tables 
2-3 and 2-4 suggest that the majority of foreign investment in China during the 
sample period benefited from income tax subsidies and a significant fraction 
benefited from subsidies on value-added taxes.  To the extent that the Chinese 
government was able to target successfully firms more likely to convey positive 
externalities, we would expect different effects for these subsidized firms.     
To test for this possibility, we split our sector-level foreign share variables into 
two groups: one is calculated based on foreign investment being subsidized (those 
paid less than the statutory tax rate)
13 and the other one is computed based on 
non-subsidized foreign investment. The results based on income tax incentives are 
presented  in  Table  9.     
  There is strong evidence that foreign firms receiving tax subsidies are more 
likely to generate positive externalities than other kinds of foreign firms. While the 
coefficients on backward linkages are positive and statistically significant for foreign 
firms which received incentives in the form of lower income taxes, the coefficients 
on backward linkages for other types of foreign firms are negative. These differences 
are significant for backward linkages but not for forward or horizontal linkages, 
where the formal F-tests fail to reject that the effects are the same.     
In Table 10, we test whether the results are different when we explore tax 
holidays on value-added taxes as a form of fiscal incentive instead.  We define 
firms as subsidized when they were exempted from paying value-added taxes 
altogether.  The results in Table 10 are consistent with differences in the effects of 
foreign investment based on income tax incentives.  In particular, forward linkages 
are significantly stronger when foreign investors received tax incentives in the form 
                                                        
13  As discussed earlier, the statutory tax rate in China is 33%. However, foreign-invested firms receive a 
preferential tax break of 15%. In this paper, we use the cut-off of 20% to distinguish whether a foreign-invested 
firm is being subsidized.   26 
 
of exemptions on value-added taxes.   
 
F.  Robustness  Tests 
   
  Since our dependent variable is firm-level productivity and the focus of the 
analysis is on how sector-level foreign investment affects domestic firm productivity, 
endogeneity is less likely to be an issue.    It is difficult to make a case that firm-level 
productivity affects sector-level foreign investment, particularly upstream and 
downstream foreign investment.  To the extent that foreign ownership could be 
attracted to sectors where suppliers or users are more productive, this is accounted 
for by the use of firm-level fixed effects.  However, some critics might argue that 
foreign investors are drawn to sectors where they expect higher productivity growth 
in the future.  To address this unlikely but nevertheless potential source of 
endogeneity, we apply instrumental variables (IV) techniques. We use future tariffs 
(tariffs at time t+1) as instruments. For instance, lnTariff (at time t+1) is used to 
instrument  Horizontal;  lnTariff_backward (at time t+1) is used to instrument 
Backward; and lnTariff_forward (at time t+1) is used to instrument Forward. Since 
our tariff data is from 1998-2007, we lose one year of observations when we apply the 
future tariffs as instruments. All identification tests show that the equations are exactly 
identified. 
  The results are reported in Table A-4.  The point estimates are magnified 
for backward linkages, confirming the importance of the linkages between domestic 
suppliers and foreign-owned buyers of their inputs.  However, the coefficients for 
non-SOE domestic enterprises on both forward and horizontal linkages become 
negative and statistically significant.  The negative and significant coefficient on 
the horizontal variable confirms previous work by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and 
others suggesting that foreign firms in the same sector act as competitors for 
domestic enterprises.    The switch in sign for the coefficient on horizontal FDI calls 
into question the positive coefficient for horizontal FDI in other specifications 27 
 
reported elsewhere in this paper, but confirms the positive vertical linkages between 
domestic suppliers and foreign users of their products. 
  
IV.  Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper, we explore the ways in which a range of institutional features, 
some general and some unique to China, affect the direction and magnitude of FDI 
spillovers.  Specifically, we examine the role played by foreign investors in 
generating productivity spillovers via horizontal and vertical linkages, as these 
spillovers affect the reform of state enterprises through joint venture activity. We also 
explore the different impacts of spillovers that originate from FDI aggregations that 
embody different mixes of investment from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan on the 
one hand and largely OECD sourced investment on the other.  Finally, our study 
investigates the implications of tariff protection for the nature of productivity 
spillovers and explores whether the Chinese government’s targeting through the 
selective imposition of tax subsidies to attract foreign investors is consistent with 
larger externalities.  The focus on the heterogeneity of spillovers across different 
institutions, as well as the variation in spillovers with differences in the tax and tariff 
regime, is a primary innovation of this paper. 
We use a rich firm-level dataset from China for the 1998-2007 period. Across a 
variety of specifications, and controlling for firm and year effects, we find that 
positive productivity spillovers from FDI take place through contacts between 
foreign affiliates and their local clients in upstream  (backward) or downstream 
sectors (forward linkages).  We also find evidence that positive productivity 
spillovers occur through horizontal foreign investment, but these types of spillovers 
are less robust, and become negative when we instrument for FDI.     
We also highlight the different effects played by the sources of sectoral foreign 
direct investment on domestic firm productivity. While at the firm level foreign 
equity participation is generally associated with higher productivity, this is not the 
case for foreign equity participation that originates in Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan.   28 
 
There are several possible explanations for this.  One major reason could be that 
such investments actually originate in China, and are simply rechanneled through 
nearby locations to take advantage of special incentives offered to foreign investors.   
Another possible explanation is that nearby foreign investors are not sufficiently 
different technologically during the last decade for which we have data.   
Finally, we also take into account trade policies and tax policies.  Controlling 
for differential tariffs across sectors is useful because some foreign investors may 
have invested in China in order to access protected domestic markets, which could 
have led to a bias in estimating the effects of foreign investment linkages on firm 
productivity.  We find that tariffs are associated with negative and significant 
effects on firm productivity.  We also find that backward and forward linkages 
were much stronger after China’s entry into the WTO, and that tariffs are associated 
with a dampened effect of vertical and horizontal linkages.    Finally, we also explore 
the extent to which foreign investors who were targeted via special tax incentives 
generated different effects on domestic firms than others.  We find significantly 
higher effects of targeted FDI on productivity growth relative to other kinds of FDI.     
In several respects the Chinese experience has been different.  Our results 
indicate that the institutional framework is critical for understanding the presence as 
well as the magnitude of such gains.  The example of how foreign investment 
originating from Greater China, which includes Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, is 
associated with zero spillovers, while foreign investment from other regions 
generates significant vertical and horizontal linkages is one vital example of the 
important role of this institutional analysis.     
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether fiscal incentives in 
the form of tax subsidies are associated with stronger linkages from foreign firms to 
domestic enterprises.  We find strong evidence that subsidized foreign investment 
generates greater productivity spillovers than unsubsidized firms.  The magnitudes 
imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of foreign investors in 
downstream sectors raises the supplying firm’s productivity by 2 to 3 percentage 
points.  The evidence also suggests that foreign firms put significant downward 29 
 
pressure on the prices of the supplying firms.  Across our sample spanning a ten 
year period, vertical linkages accounted for an important source of productivity gains 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for All Years, 1998-2007 
  Levels       Growth Rates    
   Number of 
observations  Mean Std.  Dev.  
Number of 
observations  Mean Std.  Dev. 
logY  1,545,626 10.015  1.343  1,086,616 0.135 0.563 
logL  1,545,626 4.808  1.152  1,086,616  0.013  0.503 
logK  1,545,626 8.468  1.719  1,086,616  0.107  0.753 
lnTFP  1,545,626 1.828  0.367  1,086,616  0.056  0.308 
Foreign share (contributed by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau 
investors) 
1,545,626 0.089  0.267    1,086,616 0.012 0.377 
Foreign share (contributed by 
other investors)  1,545,626 0.079  0.249    1,086,616 0.0003 0.146 
Stateshare  1,545,626 0.089  0.272  1,086,616  -0.007  0.147 
Horizontal  1,545,626 0.254  0.142  1,086,616  0.004  0.046 
Backward  1,545,626 0.077  0.046  1,086,616  0.002  0.015 
Forward  1,545,626 0.103  0.173  1,086,616  0.004  0.066 
Tariff  1,545,626 12.691  6.600  1,086,616  -0.869  2.295 
Tariff_backward  1,545,626 8.191  3.769  1,086,616  -0.319  1.611 
Tariff_forward  1,545,626 9.185  4.064      1,086,616  -0.359  2.066 
Notes: We define firm-level foreign share according to its different sources. Foreign share contributed by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau is defined as the share of firms’ total equity owned by investors from 
HK-Taiwan-Macau. Foreign share contributed by other countries is defined as the share of firms’ total 
equity owned by investors outside HK-Taiwan-Macau, principally from OECD countries. State share is 
defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Horizontal captures the intra-industry 
FDI spillover while backward and forward represent inter-industry FDI spillovers. We define horizontal, 





Table 2-1 Summary Statistics for Spillover Variables 
Horizontal     Backward     Forward 
Year  Number of 
Observations  Mean Std.  Dev.      Mean Std.  Dev.      Mean Std.  Dev. 
1998 96,135  0.204 0.125  0.059 0.034  0.068 0.103 
1999 104,253  0.220  0.132  0.066  0.038  0.077  0.120 
2000 102,745  0.233  0.134  0.071  0.040  0.085  0.136 
2001 114,735  0.240 0.135  0.071  0.041  0.089 0.142 
2002 122,464  0.242  0.132  0.073  0.042  0.090  0.143 
2003 138,377  0.250  0.139  0.075  0.044  0.099  0.166 
2004 202,735  0.270  0.146  0.082  0.049  0.109  0.180 
2005 194,274  0.273  0.149  0.083  0.049  0.117  0.199 
2006 217,062  0.275  0.146  0.085  0.048  0.120  0.201 





Table 2-2 Summary Statistics for Spillover Variables that are calculated based on sources of FDI 
Horizontal_HK Backward_HK  Forward_HK  Horizontal_FR  Backward_FR Forward_FR 
Year  Number 
of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  
1998  95,879  0.097  0.068 0.026 0.015  0.033  0.037  0.059  0.069  0.033  0.021  0.037  0.059 
1999  103,945  0.106  0.070 0.030 0.016  0.036  0.041  0.075  0.073  0.036  0.023  0.041  0.075 
2000  102,465  0.112 0.072 0.033 0.018  0.038  0.048  0.089  0.077  0.038  0.024  0.048  0.089 
2001  114,461  0.114 0.070 0.033 0.017  0.038  0.049  0.095  0.086  0.038  0.026  0.049  0.095 
2002  122,218  0.112 0.070 0.032 0.018  0.041  0.052  0.097  0.082  0.041  0.026  0.052  0.097 
2003  138,158  0.117 0.073 0.033 0.018  0.042  0.057 0.113 0.089 0.042  0.029  0.057  0.113 
2004  202,551  0.116 0.067 0.034 0.019  0.048  0.065  0.126  0.102  0.048  0.033  0.065  0.126 
2005  194,120  0.115 0.068 0.034 0.020  0.048  0.071  0.135  0.102  0.048  0.031  0.071  0.135 
2006  216,924  0.114 0.067 0.034 0.019  0.051  0.074  0.144  0.104  0.051  0.032  0.074  0.144 
2007  254,905  0.109  0.063 0.033 0.018  0.050  0.074  0.139  0.103  0.050  0.031  0.074  0.139 
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Table 2-3 Summary Statistics for Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (calculated based on income tax) 
Subsidized   Non-Subsidized 
Horizontal Backward  Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward 
Year  Number 
of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  
1998  95,879  0.076  0.060 0.022 0.015  0.024  0.047 0.112 0.068  0.033  0.018  0.038  0.050 
1999  103,945  0.083  0.067 0.025 0.018  0.027  0.056  0.125  0.069  0.040  0.020  0.046  0.064 
2000  102,465  0.096  0.072 0.029 0.020  0.033  0.070  0.130  0.070  0.041  0.021  0.049  0.068 
2001  114,461  0.102  0.075 0.031 0.020  0.034  0.057  0.130  0.067  0.039  0.021  0.052  0.083 
2002  122,218  0.107  0.080 0.035 0.025  0.041  0.091  0.128  0.066  0.037  0.018  0.047  0.059 
2003  138,158  0.110 0.078 0.034 0.023  0.042  0.083  0.131  0.069  0.039  0.021  0.053  0.080 
2004  202,551  0.132  0.090 0.041 0.027  0.054  0.110 0.129  0.063  0.038  0.020  0.051  0.070 
2005  194,120  0.132  0.096 0.041 0.028  0.055  0.110 0.131  0.064  0.039  0.021  0.058  0.092 
2006  216,924  0.138  0.094 0.043 0.028  0.057  0.101  0.126  0.061  0.039  0.020  0.057  0.097 




Table 2-4 Summary Statistics for Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (calculated based on value added tax) 
Subsidized   Non-Subsidized 
Horizontal Backward  Forward  Horizontal Backward Forward 
Year  Number 
of Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.   Mean  Std. 
Dev.  
1998 95,879  0.053 0.062  0.014  0.011  0.009  0.018 0.151 0.078 0.045  0.024  0.059  0.085 
1999 103,945  0.049  0.056 0.013 0.012  0.007  0.012  0.169  0.089  0.052  0.027  0.069  0.107 
2000 102,465  0.049 0.053  0.013  0.011  0.009  0.019 0.182 0.094 0.058  0.030  0.076  0.118 
2001 114,461  0.049 0.050  0.013  0.011  0.008  0.017 0.187 0.095 0.057  0.029  0.080  0.123 
2002 122,218  0.063  0.064 0.017 0.014  0.008  0.016  0.178  0.088  0.055  0.028  0.081  0.127 
2003 138,158  0.070  0.075 0.018 0.018  0.013  0.038  0.177  0.083  0.056  0.027  0.085  0.130 
2004 202,551           
2005 194,120  0.061  0.058 0.017 0.015  0.014  0.035  0.207  0.102  0.064  0.034  0.101  0.162 
2006 216,924  0.054  0.054 0.015 0.014  0.015  0.045  0.214  0.103  0.069  0.034  0.102  0.153 
2007 254,905  0.047  0.056 0.013 0.015  0.012  0.038  0.214  0.097  0.068  0.032  0.105  0.159 
Notes: Since the information on value added is missing for 2004, we leave the summary statistics for 2004 with blank.   
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Table 3 OLS and Olley-Pakes Regression with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables with Tariff 
controls: with vs. without firm-fixed effects (sample: all firms) 
Dependent variable: logY  Dependent variable: lnTFP 
LogL  0.0914*** 0.0755*** 
(0.0036) (0.0041) 
LogK  0.0278*** 0.0347*** 
(0.0016) (0.0024) 




-0.0018 -0.0018  -0.00353  0.0231*** 
(0.0031) (0.0052)  (0.0031)  (0.0049) 
Foreignshare (by other 
countries) 
0.0076** 0.0644***  0.0054*  0.115*** 
(0.0032) (0.0057)  (0.0032)  (0.0089) 
Stateshare  -0.0168*** -0.0586***  -0.0201*** -0.126*** 
(0.0036) (0.0060)  (0.0032)  (0.0108) 
Horizontal  0.162* 0.128  0.164*  0.0771 
(0.088) (0.116)  (0.0871)  (0.110) 
Backward  0.813*** 0.956***  0.807***  1.096*** 
(0.259) (0.331)  (0.256) (0.328) 
Forward  0.163* 0.185  0.160*  0.190 
(0.0869) (0.114)  (0.0865)  (0.119) 
lnTariff  -0.0385** 0.00198  -0.0381** -0.0129 
(0.0150) (0.0319)  (0.0151)  (0.0319) 
lnTariff_backward  -0.0276 -0.0061  -0.0289  -0.0236 
(0.0188) (0.0312)  (0.0189)  (0.0319) 
lnTariff_forward  -0.0064 -0.0396**  -0.0066  -0.0410** 
(0.0080) (0.0173)  (0.0079)  (0.0178) 
Constant  1.921*** 0.956***  1.721***  1.749*** 
   (0.0704) (0.123)      (0.0577)  (0.118) 
Firm-fixed effect  Yes No      Yes  No 
Observations  1,545,626 1,545,626  1,545,626  1,545,626 
R-squared  0.831  0.949    0.179  0.237 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. In estimates using logY (i.e., in 
column (1) and (2) as the dependent variable, logL, logM, and logK are included as regressors along 
with the firm-level controls, sector-level FDI and tariff variables. When the dependent variable is 
lnTFP (i.e. as in column (3) and (4)), the estimation procedure is two-stage. In the first stage, we use the 
OP regression method to obtain estimates for the input coefficients and then calculate lnTFP (the 
residual from the production function). In the second stage, we regress lnTFP on the remaining controls 
(firm-level foreign share, state share, sector-level FDI variables, and tariff variables).   
   *Significant at 10-percent level 
 **Significant at 5-percent level 
***Significant at 1-percent level 39 
 
Table 4 Olley and Pakes Regressions with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables and Tariff Controls: 
all firms, foreign-invested, domestic firms with zero foreign investment 
All firms  Foreign-invested 
firms 
Domestic firms (0 
foreign share) 




Foreign share (by other countries)  0.0054* 0.0132*** 
(0.0032) (0.0049) 
State share  -0.0201***  0.0023  -0.0193*** 
(0.0032) (0.0075)  (0.0034) 
Horizontal 0.164*  0.115  0.191** 
(0.0871) (0.0991)  (0.0883) 
Backward 0.807***  0.860***  0.801*** 
(0.256) (0.276)  (0.268) 
Forward 0.160*  0.246***  0.0920 
(0.0865) (0.0876)  (0.0920) 
lnTariff -0.0381**  -0.0241  -0.0417** 
(0.0151) (0.0182)  (0.0164) 
lnbwTariff -0.0289  -0.0167  -0.0350 
(0.0189) (0.0176)  (0.0211) 
lnfwTariff -0.0066  -0.0203*  -0.0027 
(0.0079) (0.0116)  (0.0072) 
Constant 1.721***  2.002***  2.053*** 
   (0.0577)  (0.0598)  (0.0416) 
Observations 1,545,626  348,029  1,197,597 
R-squared 0.179  0.204  0.166 
Horizontal*dummy  -0.124*** 
(0.046) 
F-stat (Horizontal*dummy=0)  7.14 
Prob > F 0.010 
Backward*dummy 0.011 
(0.009) 
F-stat (Backward*dummy=0)  0.62 
Prob > F 0.433 
Forward*dummy  -0.011* 
(0.006) 
F-stat (Forward*dummy=0)  19.81 
Prob > F 0 
F-stat (interaction term jointly zero)  7.76 
Prob > F     0.0002    40 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable lnTFP. 
Each regression includes firm-fixed effects and year dummies. The bottom of the table reports the 
results of tests, which compares whether three sector-level FDI variables are different across the two 
sub-samples of foreign-invested firms and domestic firms. The dummy is defined as 1 if firm i has 
















































Table 5 Olley and Pakes Regressions with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables and Tariff 
controls: all firms, foreign-invested, and domestic firms with zero foreign investment (sector-level 
FDI are calculated based on sources of FDI) 
All firms  Foreign-invested 
firms 
Domestic firms (0 
foreign investment) 





Foreign share (by other countries)  0.0059* 0.013*** 
(0.0032) (0.0048) 
Horizontal_HK -0.0198  0.0143  -0.0647 
(0.099) (0.106)  (0.105) 
Backward_HK 0.570  0.339  0.697 
(0.580) (0.581)  (0.659) 
Forward_HK -0.227  -0.241  -0.162 
(0.177) (0.154)  (0.217) 
Horizontal_FR 0.284**  0.183  0.350*** 
(0.132) (0.149)  (0.131) 
Backward_FR 0.872*  1.110**  0.764* 
(0.445) (0.522)  (0.437) 
Forward_FR 0.332**  0.457***  0.214 
(0.148) (0.116)  (0.179) 
lnTariff -0.0263*  -0.00987  -0.0313* 
(0.0154) (0.0180)  (0.0165) 
lnTariff_backward -0.0379  -0.0265  -0.0413* 
(0.0231) (0.0259)  (0.0245) 
lnTariff_forward -0.0037  -0.0153  -0.0008 
(0.0078) (0.0118)  (0.0071) 
Constant 1.715***  1.997***  2.046*** 
   (0.0638)  (0.0703)  (0.0440) 
Observations 1,545,626  348,029  1,197,597 
R-squared 0.180  0.205  0.167 
F-stat (HHK=HFR)  3.01 0.80  5.42 
Prob>F  0.088 0.374  0.023 
F-stat (BHK=BFR)  0.11 0.61  0 
Prob>F  0.736 0.438  0.944 
F-stat (FHK=FFR)  3.61 10.63  1.02 
Prob>F  0.062 0.002  0.32 
F-stat (three conditions jointly)  4.64 6.99  4.16 
Prob>F  0.006 0.004  0.009 42 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for 
each regression is lnTFP. Each regression includes firm-fixed effects and year dummies. HHK = 
Horizontal (by HK-Taiwan-Macau investors), HFR = Horizontal (by other countries). BHK = 
Backward (by HK-Taiwan-Macau investors), BFR = Backward (by other countries). FHK = 
Forward (by HK-Taiwan-Macau investors), FFR = Forward (by other countries).  43 
 
Table 6 Olley and Pakes Regressions with Contemporaneous Spillover Variables and Tariff controls: non-SOEs vs. SOEs (with the sample 
of all firms, foreign-invested, and domestic firms with zero foreign share) 
All firms     Foreign-invested firms     Domestic firms (zero foreign share) 
   Non-SOEs  SOEs     Non-SOEs SOEs      Non-SOEs  SOEs 
Foreign share (by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau) 
-0.0037 0.0348  0.0033 -0.0734 
(0.003) (0.0545)  (0.0048)  (0.0663) 
Foreign share (by other 
countries) 
0.0052 0.098**  0.013*** 0.082 
(0.0031) (0.0393)  (0.0049) (0.0692) 
State share  -0.0016  -0.0256***  0.0037  0.0172  -0.0017  -0.0259*** 
(0.0030) (0.0041)  (0.0078) (0.0305)  (0.0033)  (0.0041) 
Horizontal 0.164*  0.109  0.117  -0.506  0.194**  0.111 
(0.088) (0.100)  (0.099) (0.444) (0.089)  (0.100) 
Backward 0.785***  1.027***  0.850***  2.893***  0.765***  1.005*** 
(0.253) (0.349)  (0.275) (0.844) (0.262)  (0.350) 
Forward 0.162*  0.166  0.245***  0.483**  0.0867  0.169 
(0.0851) (0.128)  (0.0875) (0.219) (0.0882)  (0.132) 
lnTariff -0.0349**  -0.0526**  -0.0237  -0.0676**  -0.0375**  -0.0519** 
(0.0154) (0.0198)  (0.0183) (0.0312)  (0.0171)  (0.0198) 
lnTariff_backward -0.0285  -0.0163  -0.0169  0.00579  -0.0354*  -0.0159 
(0.0185) (0.0337)  (0.0176) (0.0705)  (0.0207)  (0.0338) 
lnTariff_forward -0.0086  0.0065  -0.0205*  0.0705***  -0.0046  0.006 
(0.0082) (0.0077)  (0.0115) (0.0245)  (0.0074)  (0.0077) 
Constant 1.721***  2.545***  1.913***  1.413***  1.663***  2.550*** 
   (0.0576)  (0.0690)     (0.0723)  (0.118)     (0.0598)  (0.0701) 
Observations 1,418,632  126,994  345,631  2,398  1,073,001  124,596 
R-squared  0.186  0.078     0.204  0.222     0.173  0.077 
Horizontal*ownership   -0.184**   -0.030  -0.201**  
(0.091)  (0.193)  (0.095) 
F-stat (Horizontal * ownership 
= 0) 
4.06 0.02  4.4 44 
 
Prob>F   0.048      0.879     0.04 
Backward*ownership   -0.018  -0.236   -0.042 
(0.220) (0.350)    (0.233) 
F-stat (Backward * ownership 
= 0) 
0.01 0.46  0.03 
Prob>F   0.934      0.502      0.857 
Forward*ownership  0.007   -0.100    0.043 
(0.064) (0.109)  (0.065) 
F-stat (Forward * ownership = 
0) 
0.01 0.85  0.44 
Prob>F   0.915      0.36      0.51 
F-stat (interaction terms jointly 
zero) 
6.55    1.46   6.68 
Prob>F   0.001      0.235      0.001 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regression is lnTFP. All regressions include 




















Table 7 Olley and Pakes Regressions: Allowing for Differential Spillovers with Differences in Trade Exposure 
Dependent  Variable  lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic nonSOEs  Domestic nonSOEs   Non-exporting firms  Exporters 
State share                      -0.00174  -0.00240  -0.000923  -0.0108 
(0.00332) (0.00318) (0.00406) (0.00822) 
Horizontal  0.194** 0.550** 0.211**  0.121 
(0.0897) (0.230) (0.0992)  (0.0727) 
Backward 0.765***  0.987  0.764***  0.752*** 
(0.262) (0.712) (0.286) (0.235) 
Forward  0.0867 0.502 0.0687 0.130 
(0.0882) (0.369) (0.0912)  (0.0827) 
lnTariff -0.0375**  0.0124  -0.0364*  -0.0422*** 
(0.0171) (0.0309) (0.0192) (0.0141) 
lnbwTariff  -0.0354* -0.0285 -0.0392* -0.0133 
(0.0207) (0.0384) (0.0218) (0.0219) 
lnfwTariff  -0.00458 0.000476 -0.00262  -0.0145 
(0.00742) (0.00578) (0.00764) (0.00881) 
Horizontal*lnTariff -0.154* 
(0.0809) 




Constant  1.663*** 1.541*** 1.855*** 1.669*** 
    (0.0598) (0.0777) (0.0448) (0.0616) 
Observations 1,073,001  1,073,001  856,297  216,704 
R-squared  0.173 0.174 0.163 0.204 
Notes: In this table, we implement several extension based on the results shown in column 5 in Table 6. In column 1, we reproduce results 
from column 5 in Table 6. In column 2, we add three interaction terms. In column 3, we restrict the sample to non-exporting firms. We 
re-do results with exporting firms in column 4. Firm fixed effect and year dummy variables are included in all regressions. Robust 46 
 




Table 8 Exploration of FDI Productivity Effects Prior to and Following WTO Entry at the end of 2001 
   All    Foreign-invested firms    Domestic firms 
   Non-SOEs  SOEs  Non-SOEs SOEs  Non-SOEs  SOEs 
Foreign share (by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau) 
-0.00444 0.0389  0.00610  -0.0477 
(0.00287) (0.0564)  (0.00483)  (0.0671) 
Foreign share (by other countries)  0.00418 0.107***  0.0159***  0.0844 
(0.00300) (0.0376)  (0.00499)  (0.0713) 
State  share  -0.00351 -0.0252***  0.00191  0.0155  -0.00320 -0.0255*** 
(0.00289) (0.00440)  (0.00827) (0.0307)  (0.00331) (0.00439) 
Hor_1998 0.199**  0.0630  0.296***  -0.731  0.119  0.0676 
(0.0815) (0.112)  (0.0787)  (0.528)  (0.0895) (0.112) 
Hor_1999 0.158**  0.0463  0.186**  -0.719  0.126  0.0479 
(0.0781) (0.0948)  (0.0772) (0.526)  (0.0832) (0.0946) 
Hor_2000  0.216*** 0.123  0.170** -0.561  0.217*** 0.121 
(0.0699) (0.0779)  (0.0656) (0.550)  (0.0721) (0.0767) 
Hor_2001  0.158** 0.0866  0.0992 -0.820  0.157** 0.0889 
(0.0744) (0.0708)  (0.0735) (0.542)  (0.0750) (0.0699) 
Hor_2002  0.0835 0.0422  0.0217 -0.344  0.0862 0.0480 
(0.0782) (0.0974)  (0.0730) (0.480)  (0.0789) (0.0955) 
Hor_2003  0.0598 0.0217  -0.0145  -0.424  0.0884 0.0238 
(0.0801) (0.0887)  (0.0753) (0.496)  (0.0821) (0.0890) 
Hor_2004  0.188* 0.0596  0.142  0.386  0.200* 0.0476 
(0.104) (0.134)  (0.0969)  (0.422)  (0.113) (0.134) 
Hor_2005  0.196 0.0872  0.171 0.148  0.216 0.0741 
(0.123) (0.143)  (0.118)  (0.359)  (0.130) (0.142) 
Hor_2006  0.244* 0.118  0.263**  0.423  0.253* 0.106 
(0.129) (0.164)  (0.131)  (0.456)  (0.133) (0.163) 
Hor_2007  0.289* 0.227  0.322**  0.176  0.309* 0.207 
(0.163) (0.186)  (0.151)  (0.491)  (0.175) (0.184) 
Back_1998 -0.251  -0.162  -0.644***  1.473*  0.0298  -0.229 48 
 
(0.225) (0.380)  (0.179)  (0.841)  (0.304) (0.389) 
Back_1999 -0.236  -0.278  -0.376**  1.411  -0.0847  -0.333 
(0.194) (0.326)  (0.164)  (0.974)  (0.243) (0.330) 
Back_2000 -0.0749  -0.111  -0.104  1.526  0.0289  -0.168 
(0.153) (0.229)  (0.134)  (0.970)  (0.174) (0.230) 
Back_2001 0.194  0.0457  0.155  2.234**  0.327*  -0.0218 
(0.165) (0.220)  (0.152)  (1.043)  (0.188) (0.219) 
Back_2002  0.415** 0.262  0.509***  1.298  0.432** 0.205 
(0.167) (0.287)  (0.155)  (0.885)  (0.185) (0.282) 
Back_2003  0.602*** 0.602**  0.662***  1.928**  0.665*** 0.555** 
(0.184) (0.242)  (0.158)  (0.842)  (0.213) (0.248) 
Back_2004  0.769*** 1.183***  0.721***  0.496  0.841*** 1.228*** 
(0.234) (0.338)  (0.201)  (0.768)  (0.272) (0.345) 
Back_2005  0.836*** 1.314***  0.798*** 1.465**  0.902*** 1.355*** 
(0.269) (0.407)  (0.232)  (0.642)  (0.314) (0.414) 
Back_2006  0.761** 1.460***  0.685**  1.543*  0.825** 1.462*** 
(0.295) (0.487)  (0.265)  (0.840)  (0.340) (0.502) 
Back_2007  0.820** 1.706***  0.769** 1.641**  0.879** 1.757*** 
(0.371) (0.487)  (0.319)  (0.810)  (0.430) (0.497) 
For_1998 -0.0176  -0.00245  -0.0459  -0.0493  0.0266  0.0126 
(0.0873) (0.149)  (0.0801)  (0.269)  (0.105)  (0.159) 
For_1999  0.0180 0.0423  0.0135 0.107  0.0458 0.0686 
(0.0723) (0.109)  (0.0580)  (0.283)  (0.0877) (0.110) 
For_2000  0.00939 0.0250  0.0412 0.0764  0.00315 0.0423 
(0.0423) (0.0737)  (0.0307) (0.278)  (0.0541) (0.0759) 
For_2001 0.0672  0.109  0.0901**  0.260  0.0720  0.117* 
(0.0500) (0.0659)  (0.0417) (0.286)  (0.0571) (0.0685) 
For_2002 0.136***  0.140**  0.173***  0.0465  0.123**  0.152** 
(0.0494) (0.0686)  (0.0437) (0.271)  (0.0586) (0.0705) 
For_2003 0.167***  0.134**  0.211***  0.161  0.146**  0.143** 
(0.0467) (0.0518)  (0.0402) (0.260)  (0.0566) (0.0546) 49 
 
For_2004 0.143**  0.201**  0.200***  -0.00693  0.0887  0.216** 
(0.0629) (0.0885)  (0.0514) (0.221)  (0.0762) (0.0912) 
For_2005  0.133* 0.153  0.203***  0.0120  0.0632 0.170 
(0.0776) (0.115)  (0.0601)  (0.178)  (0.0960) (0.121) 
For_2006  0.154* 0.169*  0.217***  0.00373  0.0841 0.180* 
(0.0781) (0.0999)  (0.0638) (0.218)  (0.0949)  (0.104) 
For_2007  0.163* 0.163*  0.227***  0.178  0.0860 0.180* 
(0.0911) (0.0922)  (0.0718) (0.236)  (0.111)  (0.0957) 
lnTariff  -0.0200 -0.0322*  -0.00861  -0.0332  -0.0241 -0.0321* 
(0.0172) (0.0177)  (0.0148)  (0.0431)  (0.0190) (0.0179) 
lnbwTariff -0.0267  -0.00377  -0.0126  0.00929  -0.0334*  -0.00161 
(0.0172) (0.0283)  (0.0136)  (0.0711)  (0.0200) (0.0284) 
lnfwTariff  -0.00712 0.00314  -0.0150**  0.0910***  -0.00488 0.00220 
(0.00780) (0.00735)  (0.00711) (0.0160)  (0.00795) (0.00727) 
Constant  1.740*** 2.393***  1.927***  1.221***  1.682*** 2.394*** 
    (0.0561) (0.0644)    (0.0511) (0.144)    (0.0652) (0.0656) 
Observations  1,418,632 126,994  345,631  2,398  1,073,001 124,596 
R-squared  0.190 0.083    0.212  0.274    0.175 0.082 
Notes: We keep the same structure as in Table 6. In this table, we explore time effects of sector-level spillover variables on firms’ productivity. We use year 
dummies to multiply Horizontal, Backward, and Forward separately; therefore, we have 30 interactions. Hor_interact1 = Horizontal * time dummy (when year = 
1998).  50 
 
 
Table 9 Olley and Pakes Regressions for Grouped Data with Contemporaneous Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables (constructed 
based on income tax) and Tariff Controls: non-SOEs vs. SOEs (All firms, foreign-invested, and domestic firms with zero foreign investment 
All firms    Foreign-invested firms   
Domestic firms (0 foreign 
investment) 
   non-SOEs  SOEs     non-SOEs  SOEs      non-SOEs  SOEs 
Foreign share (by HK-Taiwan-Macau)  -0.00381 0.0363  0.00368 -0.0766 
(0.00302) (0.0543)  (0.00484) (0.0675) 
Foreign share (by other countries)  0.00522 0.0986**  0.0137*** 0.0807 
(0.00313) (0.0388)  (0.00498) (0.0690) 
State share  -0.00174  -0.0254***  0.00420  0.0180  -0.00206  -0.0257*** 
(0.00290) (0.00420)  (0.00767) (0.0307)  (0.00331) (0.00421) 
Hor_subsidized 0.117  0.103  0.0512  -0.595  0.163  0.103 
(0.107) (0.133)  (0.109) (0.511) (0.111)  (0.134) 
Bw_subsidized 2.189***  2.833***  2.065***  3.203***  2.286***  2.822*** 
(0.644) (0.611)  (0.475) (0.986) (0.799)  (0.628) 
Fw_subsidized 0.165  0.203  0.238***  0.526**  0.0817  0.213 
(0.107) (0.151)  (0.0859)  (0.259) (0.141)  (0.158) 
Hor_non_subsidized 0.189*  -0.0729  0.179*  -0.429  0.188  -0.0702 
(0.104) (0.117)  (0.103) (0.355)  (0.114)  (0.119) 
Bw_non_subsidized -0.934  -1.173**  -0.649  2.287*  -1.051  -1.175** 
(0.623) (0.464)  (0.474) (1.239) (0.749)  (0.471) 
Fw_non_subsidized 0.184**  0.222**  0.261***  0.403**  0.132  0.221** 
(0.0885) (0.105)  (0.0683) (0.163)  (0.122)  (0.110) 
lnTariff -0.0346**  -0.0458**  -0.0262*  -0.0712**  -0.0366**  -0.0451** 
(0.0144) (0.0184)  (0.0155) (0.0329)  (0.0163) (0.0185) 
lnTariff_backward -0.0170  0.00734  -0.00343  0.0123  -0.0249  0.00716 
(0.0179) (0.0305)  (0.0175) (0.0727)  (0.0200) (0.0306) 
lnTariff_forward -0.00981  0.00613  -0.0211*  0.0695***  -0.00610  0.00561 
(0.00782) (0.00679)  (0.0110)  (0.0233)  (0.00716) (0.00680) 
Constant 1.728***  2.499***  1.920***  1.431***  1.673***  2.504*** 51 
 
   (0.0531)  (0.0632)     (0.0654)  (0.118)     (0.0577)  (0.0645) 
Observations 1,418,632  126,994  345,631  2,398  1,073,001  124,596 
R-squared  0.187  0.079     0.205  0.223     0.174  0.078 
F-stat (HS=HNS)  0.28 0.96  0.98 0.42  0.03 0.88 
Prob>F  0.596 0.332  0.327 0.518  0.862 0.351 
F-stat (BS=BNS)  6.72 19.12  10.39 0.42  5.01 18.02 
Prob>F  0.012 0.0001  0.002  0.52  0.029 0.0001 
F-stat (FS=FNS)  0.02 0.02  0.14 0.74  0.06  0 
Prob>F  0.882 0.889  0.705 0.394  0.813 0.955 
F-stat (three conditions jointly)  2.61 7.46  3.92 0.32  1.99 6.85 
Prob>F  0.06  0.0003    0.013  0.808    0.126  0.0005 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regressions is lnTFP. All regressions include firm 
fixed effect and year dummy variables. HS = subsidized horizontal, and HNS = non-subsidized horizontal; BS = subsidized backward, and BNS = 




Table 10 Olley and Pakes Regressions for Grouped Data with Contemporaneous Subsidized and non-Subsidized Spillover Variables 
(calculated based on value added tax) and Tariff Controls: non-SOEs vs. SOEs (all firms, foreign-invested, domestic firms) 
All firms  Foreign-invested firms  Domestic firms 
   non-SOEs  SOEs  non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs  SOEs 
Foreign share (by HK-Taiwan-Macau)  -0.0041 0.0371  0.003  -0.0765 
(0.0031) (0.0579) (0.0044)  (0.0716) 
Foreign share (by other countries)  0.0050* 0.121***  0.0130***  0.0829 
(0.0026) (0.0357) (0.0048)  (0.0698) 
State share  -0.001  -0.0250***  -0.0016  0.0312  0.0007  -0.0253*** 
(0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0091)  (0.0318)  (0.0035) (0.0046) 
Hor_subsidized 0.0398  0.230*  0.0177  -0.683  0.0662  0.249* 
(0.0871) (0.134) (0.0865)  (0.416)  (0.0963) (0.135) 
Bw_subsidized 0.831  1.133**  1.138*  2.560***  0.636  1.086** 
(0.534) (0.523) (0.572)  (0.793)  (0.574) (0.535) 
Fw_subsidized 1.068***  0.685***  1.161***  0.785***  0.943***  0.659*** 
(0.130) (0.114) (0.140)  (0.183)  (0.147) (0.118) 
Hor_non_subsidized 0.240**  0.116  0.214**  -0.518  0.255**  0.117 
(0.0928) (0.111) (0.0966)  (0.497)  (0.0978) (0.112) 
Bw_non_subsidized 0.765**  0.695  0.666**  2.763**  0.842*  0.663 
(0.376) (0.527) (0.314)  (1.109)  (0.456) (0.537) 
Fw_non_subsidized -0.0597  0.00991  -0.00319  0.408  -0.105  0.0161 
(0.102) (0.136) (0.111)  (0.258)  (0.0990)  (0.144) 
lnTariff -0.0394**  -0.0515**  -0.0295*  -0.0408  -0.0424**  -0.0510** 
(0.0165) (0.0209) (0.0175)  (0.0355)  (0.0187) (0.0209) 
lnTariff_backward -0.0324  -0.0135  -0.0263  0.0151  -0.0361  -0.0122 
(0.0198) (0.0369) (0.0185)  (0.0737)  (0.0223) (0.0371) 
lnTariff_forward -0.00487  0.0129*  -0.0134  0.0568**  -0.0017  0.0123 
(0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0110)  (0.0242)  (0.0072) (0.0076) 53 
 
Constant 2.074***  2.472***  1.939***  1.390***  1.672***  2.553*** 
(0.0401) (0.0650) (0.0723)  (0.127)  (0.0666) (0.0721) 
Observations 1,225,481  117,594  299,177  2,323  926,304  115,271 
R-squared 0.205  0.084  0.233  0.213  0.185  0.083 
F-stat (HS=HNS)  6.36 0.64 8.51  0.34  4.14  0.8 
Prob>F  0.014 0.428 0.005  0.563  0.046 0.374 
F-stat (BS=BNS)  0.01 0.26 0.42  0.04  0.05 0.23 
Prob>F  0.932 0.61 0.521  0.848  0.823  0.632 
F-stat (FS=FNS)  29.45 14.94 24.17 1.9 26.52 11.24 
Prob>F  0 0.0003 0  0.173  0  0.001 
F-stat (three conditions jointly)  13.49 8.08 11.09  1.14  10.22 6.34 
Prob>F  0 0.0001 0  0.341  0  0.001 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable for all regressions is lnTFP. All regressions 
include firm fixed effect and year dummy variables. Since the information on value added is missing for the year of 2004, we exclude the 
year of 2004 from regressions. HS = subsidized horizontal, and HNS = non-subsidized horizontal; BS = subsidized backward, and BNS 
= non-subsidized backward; FS = subsidized forward, and FNS = non-subsidized forward.  54 
 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A-1 Summary of Estimated Elasticities of Input Variables 
Coefficients on Input Variables Estimated by OLS with firm Fes and time dummies 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   Full  FIE  Domestic  Full_nonSOEs  Full_SOEs  FIE_nonSOEs  FIE_SOEs 
Domestic_nonSOEs  Domestic_SOEs 
logL  0.0918***  0.122***  0.0818***  0.0920***  0.0828***  0.122***  0.0798***  0.0809***  0.0820*** 
(0.00413)  (0.00765)  (0.00336)  (0.00434)  (0.00575)  (0.00772)  (0.0207)  (0.00360)  (0.00593) 
logK  0.0278***  0.0374***  0.0249***  0.0285***  0.0193***  0.0374***  0.0303*  0.0255***  0.0182*** 
(0.00159)  (0.00266)  (0.00152)  (0.00157)  (0.00311)  (0.00267)  (0.0152)  (0.00156)  (0.00306) 
logM  0.766***  0.732***  0.776***  0.768***  0.742***  0.732***  0.844***  0.781***  0.740*** 
(0.00683)  (0.00709)  (0.00735)  (0.00732)  (0.0107)  (0.00713)  (0.0359)  (0.00811)  (0.0110) 
Obs  1,545,626  348,029  1,197,597 1,418,632 126,994 345,694  2,403  1,073,001 124,596
Coefficients on Input Variables Estimated by Olley and Pakes Regression  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   Full  FIE  Domestic  Full_nonSOEs  Full_SOEs  FIE_nonSOEs  FIE_SOEs 
Domestic_nonSOEs  Domestic_SOEs 
logL  0.0888***  0.153***  0.068*** 0.0951*** 0.012** 0.154*** 0.0231 0.0743*** 0.012**
(0.0019)  (0.0035)  (0.0019)  (0.0022)  (0.005  (0.004)  (0.0245)  (0.0022)  (0.005) 
logK  0.0436***  0.0427***  0.044***  0.0464***  0.0205***  0.0428***  0.0644*  0.0473***  0.0202*** 
(0.0018)  (0.003)  (0.0016)  (0.0015)  (0.004)  (0.0024)  (0.027)  (0.0018)  (0.004) 
logM  0.771***  0.725***  0.785***  0.770***  0.772***  0.725***  0.836***  0.786***  0.771*** 
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.0048)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.046)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Obs  779,148  192,146  587,002  724,371  54,777  191,006  1,140  533,365  53,637 
Notes: In this table, we compare the input coefficients computed by two methods: OLS with firm fixed effects and Olley and Pakes regression. Since many firms 
report zero or negative investment, we construct our own investment measure by using capital accumulation equation (investment at current period equals the sum 
of the growth of capital and capital depreciation at the current period). However, we still lose many firms (note the changes in observations between two methods). 
When we calculate TFP using OP method, we actually apply those input coefficients to all firms in each sample. Therefore, there is no loss in efficiency in the 









Table A-2 FDI Effect on Price Level 
Dependent variable: log of price index 
Horizontal 0.008  -0.008 
 (0.017)  (0.014) 
Backward -0.097**  -0.097** 
 (0.046)  (0.045) 
Forward -0.024  -0.024 
 (0.016)  (0.015) 
Robust Standard Error  No  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  610  610 





Table A-3 Average Wages Comparison 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Year  Mean of average 
wages from the data 
Average wages from 
the National Statistical 
Yearbook (for the 
manufacturing industry) 
Average wages from 
the National Statistical 
Yearbook (for SOEs 
manufacturing firms) 
Mean of average 
wages and non-wage 
cost from the data 
The ratio of total 
wages to output 
value  
The ratio of total 
cost on labor (wages 
and non-wage cost) 
to output value 
1998 9,795  7,064  6,981  11,654  0.118  0.146 
1999 8,072  7,794  7,611  9,653  0.122  0.151 
2000 9,038  8,750  8,554  13,556  0.120  0.147 
2001 10,329  9,774  9,590  11,858  0.130  0.150 
2002  10,586      11,001      10,876      12,181     0.105      0.123 
2003 11,002  12,496  12,601  12,602  0.101  0.116 
2004 13,588      16,543  0.098  0.123 
2005 14,087  15,757  16,963  17,472  0.087  0.108 
2006  16,925         17,966  20,317  21,069  0.090  0.112 
2007  19,957         20,884  23,913  24,720  0.083  0.100 
Notes: Wages are measured in yuan/year for one person. To obtain means of average wages of the sample, we first calculate the average wage for each firm in 
each year by dividing total wages by the number of total employees then take the means of these averages. The official information on average wage is missing 
for the year of 2004, therefore we leave them with blank. In column (3) and (4), we calculate the total cost of wage and non-wage and get the mean of average 
cost for each year. For the year of 1998-2003, non-wage cost includes unemployment insurance and other welfare. Starting from the year of 2004, information 
on medical insurance and housing subsidies becomes available; therefore we include these two additional costs when we calculate the non-wage cost for the 
year of 2004-2007. In column (5), we calculate the ratio of total wages to output value (at current price, both wages and output value are in nominal term). To 





Table A-4 Robustness Tests for Table 6 (Instrumental Variable Estimation) 
   All    Foreign-invested firms    Domestic firms 
   Non-SOEs  SOEs    Non-SOEs SOEs    Non-SOEs SOEs 
Foreign share (by 
HK-Taiwan-Macau) 
-0.0011 -0.205  -0.0011  -0.0351 
(0.0035) (0.772)  (0.0056)  (0.149) 
Foreign share (by other 
countries) 
0.0060 0.103  0.0072  0.0344 
(0.0039) (0.221)  (0.0056)  (0.120) 
State share  -0.0063*  -0.0441  0.0032  0.0175  -0.0080*  -0.0312* 
(0.0037) (0.0516)  (0.0090)  (0.0455)  (0.0042)  (0.0168) 
Horizontal -0.744**  9.953  0.420  4.683  -0.682**  5.830 
(0.296) (19.16)  (0.594)  (11.85)  (0.318)  (6.988) 
Backward 3.469***  -39.11  1.201  -2.416  3.042***  -19.10 
(0.755) (100.4)  (1.466)  (16.56)  (0.715)  (41.75) 
Forward -0.479***  -18.06  0.101  -2.951  -1.156***  -11.18 
(0.0899) (35.40)  (0.166)  (7.440)  (0.154)  (14.08) 
lnTariff  -0.209*** -1.064  -0.0383 -0.491  -0.191***  -0.679 
(0.0246) (1.802)  (0.0490)  (0.752)  (0.0207)  (0.670) 
lnTariff_backward -0.0507***  -0.304  -0.0579*  0.00305  -0.112***  -0.343* 
(0.0133) (0.239)  (0.0296)  (0.304)  (0.0196)  (0.187) 
lnTariff_forward  0.0791*** 0.290  0.00983 0.257  0.109***  0.213 
   (0.0135)  (0.422)    (0.0112)  (0.394)    (0.0173)  (0.175) 
Observations 915,545  83,453  241,372  1,490  661,978  81,570 
R-squared 0.098  -4.630    0.194  -0.597    0.046  -1.598 
Notes: We keep the same structure as in Table 6. To address the potential endogeneity of sector-level FDI variables, we 
apply instrumental variables (IV) technique. We use future tariffs (tariffs at time t+1) as instruments. Since our tariff data is 
from 1998-2007, we will lose one year of observations when we apply future tariff as instruments. All identification tests 
show that the equations are exactly identified.  58 
 
Table A-5 Summary Statistics on Tariffs (by sectors) 
Tariff Tariff_backward Tariff_forward 
Industry names  Mean  Diff b/w 1998 and 
2007  Mean Mean 
1.Grain mill products  41.002  -18.29 (means fall 
by 18 percentage)  11.410 19.799 
2.Forage  13.501 -7.87  19.654  1.932 
3.Vegetable oil refining  19.85 -21.77  2.752  8.796 
4.Sugar manufacturing  37.101 10.710  5.837  14.656 
5.Slaughtering and meat processing  18.949 -4.510  10.705  15.193 
6.Fish and fish products  16.052 -12.419  12.196  10.698 
7.All other food manufacturing  22.206 -13.238  17.262  12.642 
4.384  8.Wines, spirits and liquors  27.569 -34.290  16.811 
9.Soft drink and other beverages  28.916 -20.560  16.372  1.328 
10.Tobacco products  49.584 -24.000  4.275 
11.Cotton textiles  14.96 -13.88  4.168  14.558 
12.Woolen textiles  14.96 -13.88  7.638  11.505 
13.Hemp textiles  14.96 -13.88  5.044  8.632 
14.Textiles products  17.674 -15.005  12.643  12.958 
15.Knitted and crocheted fabrics and 
articles  20.082 -17.936  12.841  13.452 
16.Wearing apparel  21.997 -16.212  14.651  11.568 
3.691  17.Leather, fur, down and related products  19.176 -8.271  7.629 
18.Products of wood, bamboo, cane, palm, 
straw  8.849 -8.346  4.591  8.130 
19.Furniture  11.7 -18.51  10.835 12.740 
20.Paper and paper products  11.975 -12.734  4.862  13.265 
21.Printing, reproduction of recording 
media  13.584 -14.950  10.897  15.092 
22.Stationary and related products  18.112 -5.306  11.426  9.624 
23.Toys, sporting and athletic and 
recreation products  12.120 -14.198  11.291  1.494 59 
 
24.Petroleum and nuclear processing  6.499 -0.930  6.647  11.159 
25.Coking  5.479 -0.080  9.099  7.447 
26.Basic chemicals  6.848 -3.13  5.342 10.513 
27.Chemical fertilizers  7.511 3.15  8.390 2.418 
28.Chemical pesticides  8.974 -2.07  7.906  1.169 
29.Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink  9.242 -3.71  6.644 10.096 
30.Man-made chemical products  10.043 -6.108  6.844  11.981 
31.Special chemical products  12.661 -5.804  6.906  10.784 
32.Chemical products for daily use  16.088 -11.882  9.763  7.675 
33.Medical and pharmaceutical products  6.535 -4.599  6.911  1.817 
34.Chemical fibers  9.825 -12.423  6.639  11.829 
35.Rubber products  16.167 -3.752  8.967  12.782 
36.Plastic products  12.583 -8.299  7.137  12.860 
37.Cement, lime and plaster  11.811 -2.741  10.929  9.913 
38.Glass and glass products  15.457 -4.890  7.790  10.669 
39.Pottery, china and earthenware  18.236 -12.03  9.899  6.928 
40.Fireproof materials  9.777 -3.671  9.550  7.751 
41.Other nonmetallic mineral products  10.030 -2.355  7.801  8.187 
42.Iron-smelting  6.601 -3.76  6.809  7.720 
43.Steel-smelting  6.601 -3.76  7.538  9.424 
44.Steel pressing  6.601 -3.76  6.700 11.368 
45.Alloy iron smelting  6.601 -3.76  6.318  6.282 
46.Nonferrous metal smelting  6.189 -2.382  5.554  7.897 
47.Nonferrous metal pressing  5.63 -2.33  6.356 11.921 
48.Metal products  12.788 -4.814  6.043  12.599 
49.Boiler, engines and turbine  10.081 -4.635  7.551  10.693 
50.Metalworking machinery  10.978 -5.201  8.875  8.637 
51.Other general industrial machinery  10.869 -6.203  7.562  11.131 
52.Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishing machinery  8.253 -5.070  9.018  1.163 60 
 
53.Other special industrial equipment  9.871 -5.426  8.575  9.798 
54.Railroad transport equipment  4.082 -1.34  8.528  2.403 
55.Motor vehicles  29.126 -26.921  11.348  7.771 
56.Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines  17.584 -18.57  6.907  13.769 
57.Ship building  7.365 -1.151  9.258  2.488 
58.Other transport equipment  25.944 -9.094  8.338  3.349 
59.Generators  10.725 -6.465  9.211  9.195 
60.Household electric appliances  18.441 -7.963  9.438  7.640 
61.Other electric machinery and equipment  15.103 -5.202  8.425  12.144 
62.Telecommunication equipment  10.992 -13.480  6.546  4.279 
63.Electronic computer  8.422 -14.87  6.629  5.235 
64.Other computer peripheral equipment  8.352 -14.828  6.780  7.261 
65.Electronic element and device  4.912 -7.01  7.641 10.988 
66.Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus  21.374 -13.97  8.162  5.635 
67.Other electronic and communication 
equipment  9.528 -5.450  8.450  5.169 
68.Instruments, meters and other measuring 
equipment  10.097 -5.150  8.621  8.603 
69.Cultural and office equipment  10.460 -9.548  8.647  4.231 
70.Arts and crafts products  16.980 -7.374  10.600  6.483 
71.Other manufacturing products  19.324 -5.036  10.777  9.855 
 
Average (all sectors) 




Table A-6 Summary Statistics on foreign investment (by sectors) 
Industry names  Mean of firm-level foreign 
share (range from 0 to 100) 
Diff b/w 1998 and 
2007 
Mean of horizontal 
(range from 0 to 100) 
Diff b/w 1998 
and 2007 
1.Grain mill products  1.5 0.2  4.0  -2.0 
2.Forage  8.3 1.2  20.1  -10.7 
3.Vegetable oil refining  4.8 1.3  28.1  13.4 
4.Sugar manufacturing  3.4 2.9  7.7  5.3 
5.Slaughtering and meat processing 5.7 1.3  16.9  4.9 
6.Fish and fish products  19.7 7.6  19.7  3.4 
7.All other food manufacturing  16.6 4.8  28.8  2.2 
8.Wines, spirits and    liquors  6.4 3.5  15.3  1.2 
9.Soft drink and other beverage  15.0 1.6  41.2  8.2 
10.Tobacco products  1.1 1.1  0.2  -0.1 
11.Cotton textiles  10.0 0.7  14.4  1.7 
12.Woolen textiles  15.6 -2.8  21.9  0.7 
13.Hemp textiles  5.9 3.1  8.7  4.6 
14.Textiles products  20.3 4.7  24.7  3.4 
15.Knitted and crocheted fabrics and 
articles  26.0 -3.3  31.4  -2.2 
16.Wearing apparel  32.1 -1.4  36.0  -2.6 
17.Leather, fur, down and related products 30.9 0.3  42.3  -0.9 
18.Products of wood, bamboo, cane, palm, 
straw  12.0 -2.9  17.2  -7.6 
19.Furniture  24.5 4.1  39.6  8.4 
20.Paper and paper products  11.8 3.8  24.6  8.0 
21.Printing, reproduction of recording 
media  9.5 3.0  22.4  1.9 
22.Stationary and related products 25.3 6.1  34.6  12.2 62 
 
23.Toys, sporting and athletic and 
recreation products  42.0 -1.5  54.4  3.2 
24.Petroleum and nuclear processing 7.2 2.8  7.5  4.2 
25.Coking  2.2 1.0  5.1  5.1 
26.Basic chemicals  6.2 2.4  9.7  9.7 
27.Chemical fertilizers  3.1 3.3  3.1  3.1 
28.Chemical pesticides  5.5 3.7  8.8  2.0 
29.Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink  17.5 8.0  30.3  16.8 
30.Man-made chemical products 18.6 6.5  25.3  12.8 
31.Special chemical products  10.0 2.1  18.3  9.8 
32.Chemical products for daily use 20.4 8.8  48.3  18.9 
33.Medical and pharmaceutical products 10.4 3.1  16.8  4.4 
34.Chemical fibers  14.9 0.9  18.5  0.7 
35.Rubber products  17.0 6.8  27.9  8.1 
36.Plastic products  21.7 0.5  33.0  1.0 
37.Cement, lime and plaster  5.3 2.8  9.4  3.7 
38.Glass and glass products  12.4 0.6  18.4  5.9 
39.Pottery, china and earthenware 17.1 -0.1  23.5  -1.1 
40.Fireproof materials  4.8 3.0  7.4  2.7 
41.Other nonmetallic mineral products 7.9 2.7  13.5  0.5 
42.Iron-smelting  3.2 -0.3  5.6  -4.5 
43.Steel-smelting  4.7 1.6  6.7  6.8 
44.Steel pressing  6.3 4.0  10.9  8.0 
45.Alloy iron smelting  2.5 -0.2  4.8  -2.2 
46.Nonferrous metal smelting  5.8 1.5  6.1  0.3 
47.Nonferrous metal pressing  9.5 3.9  15.7  4.5 
48.Metal products  15.2 2.6  25.9  2.2 
49.Boiler, engines and turbine  5.6 3.6  11.1  0.9 63 
 
50.Metalworking machinery  10.8 5.4  12.6  5.0 
51.Other general industrial machinery 10.1 4.4  20.9  5.7 
52.Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishing machinery  3.3 6.3  3.8  6.2 
53.Other special industrial equipment 14.2 10.6  18.6  14.7 
54.Railroad transport equipment 3.7 4.9  2.9  4.3 
55.Motor vehicles  6.7 3.1  24.0  3.9 
56.Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines  13.3 10.8  27.9  21.4 
57.Ship building  12.6 0.9  12.0  4.9 
58.Other transport equipment  13.4 3.0  19.0  2.3 
59.Generators  15.3 6.0  25.5  10.5 
60.Household electric appliances 22.9 4.6  31.5  7.5 
61.Other electric machinery and equipment 23.0 4.2  36.2  3.6 
62.Telecommunication equipment 27.6 10.4  55.5  16.3 
63.Electronic computer  43.5 22.1  81.8  54.2 
64.Other computer peripheral equipment 59.5 11.9  85.8  14.5 
65.Electronic element and device 44.3 10.2  68.7  27.1 
66.Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus  46.1 10.8  54.4  19.4 
67.Other electronic and communication 
equipment  35.7 5.2  59.6  10.3 
68.Instruments, meters and other 
measuring equipment  23.7 3.0  36.5  7.7 
69.Cultural and office equipment 45.8 8.9  85.7  9.0 
70.Arts and crafts products  25.9 3.7  30.7  1.1 
71.Other manufacturing products 25.6 4.0  36.1  -3.8 
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